国际政,治研究所:5G地缘政,治【精选推荐】

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国际政,治研究所:5G地缘政,治【精选推荐】

 

 5

  G

 technol ogies

 are reshaping

 the w a y

 user s

 e xperience

 the digital

 sphere

 and,

 thus, their

 dail y

 lives.

 5G

 is one

 o f

 the game

 changer s

 tha t

 w oul d

 further

 enable

 c yber space ’ s po ten tialities

  f or

  our

  socie ties,

  ec onomies,

  and

  lifes t yle.

 Ye t,

  there

 are

 mul tiple

  and c on tr as ting

 geopolitical

  in terests

  and

  securit y

  c oncerns

  regar ding

  5G

  adoptions

  and implemen ta tions.

 The

 curren t

 c onfr on ta tion

 be t ween

 Chinese

 c ompanies

 and

 some

 Wes tern go vernmen ts

  is

 emblema tic.

 Wha t

  are

 the

 political

 and

  securitarian

 implications

 o f

  such

 technol ogical

 dispu tes?

 Ho w

 are s ta tes

 dealing

 with

 the securit y

 o f

 5G

 technol ogies?

  * Samuel e

 Dominioni is

 a

 R esear ch

 F ell o w

 at

 the ISPI

 Cen tr e

 on Cybersecurity ,

 in

 partnership

 with

 Leonar do.

 * Cou nsel or

 F abio

 R ugge

 is

 H ead

 o f

 ISPI"s

 Cen tr e

 on Cybersecurity ,

 in

 partnership

 with

 Leonar do.

 H e

 is

 a dipl omat

 curr en tl y

 working as

 H ead

 o f

 the

 Offic e

 in

 char ge

 f or

 NA T O

 and

 Security

 and

 Politico-Milit ary Issues, Dir ect or at e

 Gener al f or

 Politic al A ff airs

 and

 Security ,

 Ministry

 o f

 F or eign A ff airs

 and

 In t ernational Cooper ation.

  1.

 5G

 IN

 A

 C ONTE S TED

 DOMAIN

 FABIO

 R UGGE

  (MAECI

 and

 ISPI)

 2.

 WHA T

 DOE S THE

 EU

 S A Y

 ABOUT

 5G? C orr ado

 Gius t o zzi

 (ENIS A

 and

 AGID )

  3.

 THE

 “UK

 TURN”

 ON

 5G,

 A

 DOMINO

 EFFE C T? E s ther

 Na ylor

 (Cha tham

 House )

  4.

 THE

 R A CE

 OF

 CHINE SE

 C OMP ANIE S IN

 THE

 5G

 C OMPETITION

 L yu

 J inghua

 (Carnegie

 E ndo wmen t

 f or

 In terna tional

 Peace )

  5.

 WILL

 5G

 PUSH

 INTERNET

 V O TING?

 S amuele

 Dominioni

 (ISPI)

  6.

 IT A L Y ,

 NA TIONAL

 SE CURITY

 AND

 5G

 S tef ano

 Mele

 (Carnelu t ti)

 T

  5G

 in

 a

 C ont es t ed

 Domain

 F abio

 R ugge

 MAECI,

 ISPI

  F abio

 R ugge

  is

 Head

  o f

  ISPI" s

  Cen tre

  on

  C yber securit y, in

  partner ship

 with

  Leonar do.

  He

  is

 a

  dipl oma t

  curren tl y w orking

  as

  Head

  o f

  the

 Office

  in

  charge

  f or

  NA T O

  and Securit y

 and

 P olitic o-Military I ssues,

 D irect or a te

 Gener al

 f or P olitical

 Affair s

 and

 Securit y,

 Minis try

 o f

 F oreign

 Affair s

 and

 he

 in terna tional

 deba te

 regar ding

 the acquisition o f

 Chinese

 5G

 technol ogy appear s

 s ymbolic

 o f

 the re-emerging

 Grea t

 P o wer

 C ompe tition,

 and

 s tark

 pr oo f o f

 the ongoing

 dec oupling

 o f

 the gl obal

 IC T

 supply

 chain.

 W ashingt on

 has

 been

 pressing its

 allies f or

 more

 than a

 year

 no t

 t o

 adopt Chinese

 5G

 technol ogy

 and

 threa tened

 dr as tic cu ts

 in

 in telligence

 inf orma tion- sharing

 with tho se

 pr ocuring

 it.

 We

 canno t

 ascribe

 these de vel opmen ts

 t o

 W ashingt on ’ s

 hidden

 marke t - share

 c onsider a tions,

 as

 the US

 marke t

 does no t

 ye t

 offer

 a

 c ompe ting technology,

 nor

 can we

 c onsider

 them

 ye t

 ano ther

 e x ample

 o f Presiden t

 Trump’ s

 t ough

 po sitions on

 tr ade nego tia tions,

 especiall y

 with

 China,

 because

 it

 is since

 2012 tha t

 the US

 A dminis tr a tion

 has pr ohibited se ver al

 go vernmen t

 agencies,

 on the gr ounds

 o f

 “na tional

 securit y

 risk”,

 fr om acquiring

 pr oducts

 fr om

 Hua wei

 and

 ZTE, t w o o f

 China ’ s

 mo s t

 success ful

 high- tech

 e xporter s. I s

 Chinese

 5G

 technol ogy

 so

 danger ous, and

 if so,

 wh y

 is the ban

 on

 Chinese

 5G

 technol ogy

 so c on ten tious?

 September

 2020

 IT ALIAN

 INSTITUTE F OR

 INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES

  5G

 ne t w ork s

 will

 enable

 the Interne t

 o f Things

 re v olu tion,

 which,

 t oge ther

 with the e xponen tial

 pr ogresses

 in

 c ompu ting po wer

 and

 adv ances

 in

 AI,

 will

 tr ans f orm

 our e very da y

 life

 in

 w a y s

 we

 can

 barel y

 imagine. 5G

 ne t w ork s

 will

 represen t

 the nerv ous

 s y s tem c onnecting

 the political,

 s tr a tegic,

 military, inf orma tive,

 ec onomic, financial,

 indus trial

 and

 infr as tructural

 dimensions

 a t

 a

 per sonal, l ocal,

 na tional,

 in terna tional

 and

 tr ansna tional le vel.

 In this

 scenario, there are a t

 leas t

 three ca tegories

 o f

 risk s

 tha t

 migh t

 arise fr om

 rel ying upon

 un trus ted

 5G

 ne t w ork s.

 The

 fir s t

 is the “classic”

 risk

 o f

 espionage

 b y

 f oreign

 en tities

 (be the y

 go vernmen tal

 or

 priv a te

 c ompanies subject

 t o

 a

 s tr ong

 go vernmen t ’ s

 direction), targe ting go vernmen ts ’

 c onfiden tial

 inf orma tion, c ommercial

 or

 indus trial

 secre ts,

 our

 per sonal lives.

 This

 w oul d

 certainl y

 po se

 a

 direct

 threa t

 t o

 our

 freedom, t o

 our

 independence

 and

 t o

 our wel f are.

 A

 5G

 c on tr olled

 more

 or

 less

 directl y b y

 f oreign

 en tities

 w oul d

 also

 give

 them

 the po wer

 t o

 pr ofile

 user s,

 t o

 manipula te

 da ta

 and divert

 da ta

 flo w,

 and

 even tuall y

 t o

 influence

 our individual perceptions

 and

 our

 public

 opinions. C yber -enabled

 inf orma tion

 w arf are alread y appear s

 t o

 be

 one

 o f

 the instrumen ts

 o f

 choice in

 the ongoing

 in terna tional

 c onfr on ta tion,

 and

 it has

 pr o ven

 its

 des tabilizing

 po ten tial

 in

 se ver al in terna tional

 crises.

 De vel opmen ts

 in

 deep- f ake technol ogy

 and

 in

 “au t oma ted

 pr opaganda”

 will certainl y

 ele v a te

 the threa t

 even

 further .

 Finall y, in

 time

 o f

 crisis,

 an

 un trus ted

 pr o vider migh t

 use

 the ne t w ork

 t o

 e xert

 political

 and

 ec onomic

 pressure

 and

 t o

 acquire

 a

 military

 adv an tage, f or

 instance

 if

 its

 oper a t or s

 denied

 an

 essen tial service

 t o

 a

 critical

 na tional

 infr as tructure,

 or

 if

 it

 v olun taril y

 pr o vided

 f orged

 da ta,

 or

 sabo taged essen tial

 democr a tic

 or

 indus trial

 pr ocesses,

 or hampered

 political

 decision-making

 on

 issues

 o f na tional

 securit y

 and

 defence. Agains t

 this

 back dr op,

 polic y -maker s

 mus t decide

 whe ther

 t o

 all o w

 Chinese

 off- the- shel f

 pr o vider s

 t o

 pre v ail

 or

 if

 it

 is more appr opria te

 t o

 dela y

 the fiel ding

 o f

 5G

 in

 or der f or

 trus ted

 vendor s

 t o

 be

 able

 t o

 offer

 a

 sa fer and

 more

 secure

 al terna tive.

 I t

 is indeed

 an

 unpreceden ted

 dilemma

 f or

 our

 polic y -maker s, accus t omed

 t o

 a

 Wes tern

 technol ogical superiorit y

 tha t

 is no w

 increasingl y

 challenged

 in e very

 domain, and

 t o

 free-marke t

 dogmas

 tha t manda ted

 the gl obaliza tion

 o f

 supply

 chains.

 Responses

 ha ve

 so

 f ar

 been

 diver se.

 Some Wes tern

 c oun tries

 dela yed

 the acquisition o f 5G

 technol ogy

 al t oge ther,

 while some

 o ther s tried

 t o

 dis tinguish

 be t ween

 “c ore”

 and

 “non- c ore”

 parts

 o f

 the ne t w ork s,

 assuming

 it

 will

 be po ssible

 t o

 pr ocure

 Chinese

 5G

 technol ogy f or

 the la t ter .

 Some

 s ta tes,

 also,

 decided

 t o impo se

 specific securit y

 s tandar ds

 f or

 IC T c omponen ts

 f or

 specific sect or s

 o f

 na tional securit y

 importance. Man y

 o ther s

 ha ve

 ye t

 t o

 sa y

 the final

 w or d,

 and

 ha ve

 so

 f ar

 changed

 their

 po sition

 a

 fe w

 times.

 Na tional

 securit y

 c oncerns

 normall y

 pre v ail withou t

 t oo

 much

 hassle

 o ver

 marke t

 or ec onomic

 de vel opmen t

 c onsider a tions, especiall y

 where

 there is so

 much

 public a t ten tion.

 The

 issue

 o f

 Chinese

 5G,

 on

 the o ther

 hand,

 seems

 t o

 be

 o f

 a

 differen t

 kind.

 I s it

 because

 the Wes t

 canno t

 accept

 delaying the digital

 tr ans f orma tion

 enabled

 b y

 5G,

 no

 ma t ter

 what?

 I s

 it

 because

 o f

 the very

 significan t

  in ves tmen ts

 tha t

 Chinese

 pr o vider s

 are willing t o

 make

 in

 Wes tern

 infr as tructure ?

 Or

 is it because,

 a fter

 S no w den ’ s

 re vela tions,

 the public opinions

 o f

 E ur ope

 belie ve

 tha t,

 since

 e very one hack s,

 it

 does

 no t

 reall y

 make

 a

 difference who t o

 trus t,

 especiall y

 in

 the ab sence

 o f

 c oncre te pr oo fs

 tha t

 the Chinese

 go vernmen t

 used

 its ascendanc y

 o ver

 Hua wei

 and

 ZTE

 t o

 hack

 da ta ? Ma ybe

 the ans wer

 is a

 c ombina tion

 o f

 bo th these

 reasons,

 or

 ma ybe

 the f act is tha t

 there is simpl y

 a

 gener al

 lack

 o f

 a w areness

 abou t the threa ts

 s temming

 fr om

 c yber space,

 and po ssibl y

 also

 abou t

 the reasons,

 the bearings and

 the pr actical

 implications o f

 the ongoing ne w

 Grea t

 P o wer

 C ompe tition.

 This

 lack

 o f

 a w areness

 is under s tandable: c yber space

 is the domain

 o f

 ambiguit y,

 where it

 is impossible

 t o

 under s tand

 and

 an ticipate

 the mo tiv a tion

 and

 the sc ope

 o f

 a

 c yber

 campaign withou t

 c onsidering

 the s tr a tegic,

 political

 and oper a tional

 c on te xt

 in

 which

 it

 occur s.

 The

 difficul t y

 in

 a t tribu ting the c yber a t tack s,

 t oge ther

 with

 the widespread

 recour se

 in

 c yber space t o

 f alsel y

 flag

 c ompu ter

 ne t w ork

 oper a tions, make

 it

 difficul t

 t o

 kno w

 “wha t

 is reall y

 going

 on”

 in

 the c yber

 domain, and

 t o

 make

 sense

 ou t o f

 it.

 C ybercrime, hacktivism,

 in telligence

 and military

 c ompu ter

 ne t w ork

 oper a tions,

 all

 share the same

 domain

 and

 the y

 all

 use

 the same tactic s,

 techniques

 and

 pr ocedures,

 and

 the y all

 e xpl oit

 the same

 vulner abilities.

 C yber space has

 theref ore

 become

 the domain

 o f

 choice

 f or

 des tabilising campaigns

 and

 engaging

 in

 ho s tile activities

 tha t

 w oul d

 be

 simpl y

 unsus tainable in

 the c on ven tional

 realm.

 Na tional

 in telligence c ommunities

 usuall y

 are be t ter

 placed

 and equipped

 t o

 handle

 sensible

 inf orma tion

 and

 gr asp

 the c omple xit y

 “behind

 the curtains”

 o f the ongoing

 c onfr on ta tion

 in

 the c yber

 domain

 – bu t

 this

 is also

 ano ther

 reason

 wh y

 an

 in-depth under s tanding

 o f

 c yber

 affair s

 is no t

 easil y accessible

 t o

 the gener al

 public,

 or

 even

 a t

 the ins titu tional

 le vel.

 I f

 wha t

 happens

 “in

 and

 ar ound” c yber space

 is alread ...

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